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Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) Programs: Have We Paid too Much? 
 
Abstract 
While many states such as Vermont have adopted the Purchase of Development Rights 
(PDR) programs to protect farmland, few studies have examined how the prices of such 
development rights are determined and whether the prices are close to the market value.  Using 
data from the state of Vermont, this study first examines the effects of development restrictions 
on the market price of rural and semi-rural properties and then addresses the question of whether 
the prices paid for development rights are close to the market value.  Our results based on an 
hedonic model suggest that development restrictions do reduce the market value of rural and 
semi-rural properties in Northern Vermont but the prices paid by Vermont’s PDR programs are 
significantly higher than the estimated market value. 
 
Introduction 
The steady decline in farmland in the US has rapidly emerged as a major concern of the 
public and policymakers (Daniels, Schnidman et al., Hanley).  While the changes in farm land in 
the state of Vermont and the United States during 1959 to 1992 are presented in Figure 1, it is 
clear that the loss in farmland is a problem in Vermont as well as in the United States.  Although 
a small percentage of the lost farmland might be converted to wood land, most of the lost 
farmland has been converted to developed uses such as highway strip centers, shopping centers, 
office complexes, residential development, and industrial uses.  In response to the steady decline 
in agricultural land, many states have adopted alternative measures such as the purchase of 
development rights (PDR) programs to protect farmland or at least to slow down the conversion   2
of agricultural land into development uses (Daniels, Hanley).  Public interest in the protection of 
agricultural land has been spurred by a number of considerations.  First, loss of open space to 
development and the change in rural land uses from working farm practices to non-farm 
developments threaten to eliminate scenic amenities.  Second, farmland conversion has resulted 
in negative economic consequences for those who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.  
Third, in some areas, there is a concern that farmland conversion will be detrimental to the 
natural aesthetic appearance of the region and thus could cause the loss of environmental quality, 
tourism income, and natural resource based recreational amenities (Albers).  Fourth, the public 
has expressed concerns over the loss of local food production capabilities and reducing 
availability of locally grown fresh food products.  
Under a PDR program, a conservation agency or land trust purchases the development 
rights from the landowner and therefore legally protects the land from development although the 
landowner may continue to use the land for particular purposes such as farming and recreation 
(Daniels, Wright).  In the state of Vermont, the Vermont Housing and Conservation Board 
(VHCB) has spent about 29 million dollars to purchase the development rights of about 70,000 
acres of land since the inception of the state’s PDR program in 1987 (VHCB).  The PDR 
programs in Vermont and five other Northeast states have spent a total of almost 400 million 
dollars since the late 1970s and have protected about 0.24 million acres of farmland (US Bureau 
of Census).  While almost all the PDR programs are funded by a combination of tax revenues, 
grants and tax-deductible donations, there are two related questions: how are the prices of 
development rights determined and whether the conservation agencies have paid too much or too 
little for the development rights?  The major objective of this study is to address these two 
questions using data from Northern Vermont.   3
In order to minimize the costs to taxpayers, publicly operated expenditure programs such 
as PDR must be run as efficiently as possible.  The programs must also be fair to the landowner 
who is giving up the "development rights."  When the state and private citizens enter into 
purchase and sale agreements, a price that is fair to both parties must be determined in order to 
be equitable to both taxpayers and property owners.  While the property owner typically attempts 
to collect the highest price possible from the state, the PDR program managers have a fiduciary 
responsibility to the taxpayers to negotiate the lowest price they can from the property owner.  
Because program managers may not have the typical motivations of real property market 
participants and may not face a typical set of risk factors in their investment decisions regarding 
development right purchases, one concerns is how to ensure that the public is fairly charged for 
the purchase of development rights.   
Although the regulation and court decisions indicate that the development rights should 
be purchased at the market value, there is seldom any law that ensures the PDR agencies to 
compensate the land owner at the market value for the development rights.  Unlike many 
government agencies that estimate market value for the purposes of property acquisition, PDR 
agencies generally do not have secondary appraisers to review easement appraisals.  Although 
review appraisals have been mandated for the VHCB since 1996 due to the use of federal 
transportation funds for the purchases of conservation easements, there is no oversight body that 
has the authority to confirm that these reviews take place. 
The lack of a legal mandate to purchase these easement properties at market value and 
the uncertainty of using review appraisals have brought about some doubt on the reliability of the 
easement valuations under the PRD programs.  While a fair price is important for the taxpayers   4
and landowners, it is interesting to examine whether the VHCB has paid too much or too little 
for the development rights under the PDR programs. 
 
A Survey of Professional Appraisers in Vermont 
Anecdotal evidence via personal conversations with participants in the development 
rights market, including VHCB staff, real estate brokers, farm and farmland owners, and 
professional appraisers, indicated that many of them have the perception of some degree of 
misvaluation or mispayment for conservation easements on the part of development rights 
purchasers.  In order to more accurately quantify this concern, a brief survey of persons who are 
knowledgeable with development rights valuations and purchases was developed to determine if 
this anecdotal evidence merited further investigation.  
A survey was developed and sent to certified general appraisers in the state of Vermont in 
August 1996.  The survey was sent to this classification of appraisers because only certified 
general appraisers are legally authorized to perform development rights valuations.  Our mailing 
list included all the 87 certified appraisers registered with both the Vermont Secretary of State's 
Office and the Vermont Real Estate Commission at the time of the survey.  The survey asked the 
appraisers questions pertaining to their knowledge about prices paid for development rights by 
the VHCB and whether they felt prices paid for development rights were reflective of market 
value for these rights.  If a appraiser felt that the purchase prices were not reflective of market 
value, he or she was asked to indicate if it was higher or lower than the market value.  The 
appraisers were also asked to estimate how divergent, in percentage terms, these prices were 
from market value in their opinion.  Additionally, they were asked at what frequency they felt 
these development rights purchases were misvalued.  The appraisers were also asked to give   5
specific examples of misvalued purchases.  While all the 87 appraisers were sent a copy of the 
survey, 56 completed surveys were returned, resulting in a response rate of 64.4%.  Of those who 
returned the surveys, approximately 61.4% of the respondents or 39.6% of the total population 
reported that they were familiar with the PDR programs.  Of those who reported being familiar 
with VHCB purchases, 93.3% reported that they felt these purchases were at least sometimes 
unreflective of market value for similar properties.  As shown in Figure 2, 80% of the 
respondents felt that the prices paid by VHCB were at least 10% above the market value, 52% 
felt that these prices were at least 20% above the market value, and 28% felt that these prices 
were at least 30% above market value.  On the other hand, 20% felt that these prices were at least 
10% below the market value, 16% felt that these prices were at least 20% below the market 
value, and 4% felt that these prices were at least 30% below market value.  Note that the 
respondent groups in Figure 2 are not exclusive.  For example, appraisers who reported that 
prices paid by PDR were at least 20% over the market value were also included in the group that 
reported the prices paid by PDR were at least 10% above the market value. 
A total of fifteen respondents also submitted comments.  Twelve or 80% of them were 
from appraisers who responded that the prices for conservation easements were higher than the 
market value.  Comments from respondents who reported overpayments were not only more 
numerous but also more critical of the problem as compared with the comments from those who 
reported underpayments.  For example, development rights values in rural areas were referred to 
as "fictional", "unrealistic" or "nonexistent".  One appraiser felt that the market was "controlled" 
by a "small number" of appraisers.  A couple of appraisers pointed out on their questionnaires 
that there can be no such thing as development rights value on farmland or wetlands which are 
simply unsuitable for building development.  Another respondent cited a number of examples   6
where the VHCB had purchased development rights in areas where there was no evidence that 
any development rights value existed.   
This survey indicates that many professional appraisers in Vermont are concerned about  
a systematic problem in the valuation of development rights for the VHCB.  A majority of the 
surveyed appraisers believed that the purchase prices of development rights were higher than the 
market value.  These results from the survey suggest that there is a need for further study into the 
field of development rights valuation. 
 
An Hedonic Model Analysis 
An hedonic price model is used to identify the factors that determine the price of rural 
and semi-rural properties and estimate the market value for development rights.  Results from the 
model are then used to examine the difference between the prices paid by VHCB and the prices 
estimated from the estimation.   
 
Conceptual framework 
Hedonic pricing theory suggests that commodities are composed of a number of 
attributes, characteristics or traits and that each of these attributes contributes some fractional 
amount to the total price at which the consumer is willing to pay for the good or at which the 
supplier is willing to sell the good (Waugh, Goodman, Bowman and Ethridge, Rosen, Griliches).  
The hedonic model assumes a continuous function relating the price of a good to its various 
attributes or characteristics and consumers select a particular good by equating the marginal 
utility of each attribute to its marginal price.  To estimate the market value of attributes, the   7
model obtains a vector of implicit marginal values by differentiating the price (P) with respect to 
the ith element, zi, and evaluating the derivative at the level of the attributes purchased or sold. 
The model can be expressed as: 
 
  P = f(z1, z2, ..., zn), 
 
where P is the price, and zi is the ith attribute.  The hedonic technique obtains observations on 
prices of a commodity with varying levels of characteristics, attributes or qualities.  A regression 
model is then used to estimate the hedonic price function.  The gradients of the hedonic price 
function are the implicit prices of the attributes, and the ratio of the implicit price of one attribute 
to another reflects the consumers' marginal rate of substitution between the two attributes. 
In this study, it is hypothesized that prices and hence market values of rural and semi-
rural real properties are based upon an hedonic function of a number of determinants or 
characteristics.  In simply comparing the price per acre or price per property of conservation 
easement restricted parcels to similar unrestricted parcels, it is difficult to ascertain if price 
differentials between the two parcel types are due simply to the development restriction 
encumbrance.  This is because other factors or attributes could be influencing the price in one 
direction or another.  When including conservation easement as a physical characteristic 
variable, a significant difference between these land use types would indicate the direction and 
degree of the effect on prices of restrictions on agricultural land.  The difference between the 
contribution of conservation easement encumbered and unencumbered lands should also 
approximate the market values of the conservation easements themselves.  
Hedonic pricing models attempt to predict the value or price of a good based on the 
contribution of characteristics of that good.  In the case of this study, regression analyses have   8
been conducted to estimate the effects on price of certain characteristics of real properties located 
in the northern Vermont region.  
 
Data Set and Variables 
In order to analyze the effect of conservation easement encumbrances on farm land price 
levels, a thorough examination of actual sale data of improved farm as well as rural and semi-
rural vacant land parcels was undertaken.  Data were gathered from a wide variety of sources.  
These data sources included public land records, town assessment records, town clerk's office 
files, a number of professional appraisers' files, farm loan company files, Vermont Housing and 
Conservation Board files, as well as personal interviews and correspondences with property 
owners and participating parties in sale transactions.  Most of the properties were also visually 
inspected by the second author of this paper over the period from the summer of 1992 to the 
spring of 1999.   
Sale data of farm and farmland are somewhat limited when compared to sale data of 
other types of properties.  These types of property are infrequently sold in comparison to other 
classes of properties such as small acreage residential properties or building sites.  However, 
sufficient data were found to study specific market reactions to value.  Because of the relative 
scarcity of transactions, the research period includes an extensive time period, from 
approximately January 1987 through January 1999.  The geographical region was limited to 
northern Vermont counties encompassing Addison, Caledonia, Chittenden, Franklin, Grand Isle, 
Lamoille, Orleans, Orange, and Washington counties. Sale data were also limited to properties 
with parcel sizes larger than 25 acres.  This size level is considered to be a reasonable limitation.  
Parcel sizes smaller than this level are generally not considered to be agriculturally viable parcels   9
in their own right.  Parcels smaller than this are generally utilized as small to large rural 
residential building lots or similar nonagricultural uses.  These parcels are not considered to be in 
the same market as the larger agricultural parcels in this study.  Parcel sizes ranged from 25 acres 
to approximately 579 acres. 
Two classes of properties were examined in the overall analysis: improved farm 
properties including barns, dwellings and outbuildings, and vacant land parcels.  Vacant land 
portions of improved farm properties typically contribute a significant portion to the total farm 
asset value.  Stand alone vacant land properties and vacant land portions of improved farm 
properties are generally considered to be comparable to one another, competitive and have 
similar highest and best uses.  It was therefore considered to be reasonable to analyze vacant land 
parcels as improved farm parcels with no contribution of value from land or building 
improvements.  Farm properties also display wide degrees of variability as to characteristics, 
particularly in the areas of building and land improvements, land classes and locational 
influences.  However, the data were considered to be extensive and conclusive enough to identify 
certain market reactions.   
A total of 276 transfers of improved farm parcels and vacant land parcels which occurred 
between April 1987 and December 1998 were found in the data search.  It is recognized that this 
is not a complete and comprehensive list of all agricultural real property transactions within the 
study geographic area and time period.  Of these transfers, 91 or approximately 33.0% were 
improved farm properties and 185 or approximately 67.0% were vacant land parcels.  
Nearly two-thirds of the collected data consisted of unencumbered vacant land, while an 
additional one-quarter of the sales were unencumbered parcels with buildings.  Less than 10% of   10 
the collected sales were of either improved or unimproved encumbered properties.  This is due 
primarily to the rarity of sales of encumbered properties.   
Physical, socio-demographic as well as locational data associated with each sale were 
compiled.  A time variable was also included within a sale date index.  The selected variables 
were thought to be factors that influence the value of agricultural lands in the study area.  Similar 
variables have been utilized in many previous studies.  A summary of the variable names and a 
brief description of the variables are reported in Table 1.   
 
Regression Models and Results    
While the dependent variable is the price, independent variables are divided into several 
broad categories: time, physical characteristics, geographic location, and the socio-demographic 
characteristics associated with the area population.  This can be expressed in the following 
function: 
 
SP = f (T, P, S, L) 
 
where SP is the sale price, T is time, P is a vector of physical characteristics, S is a vector of 
sociodemographic characteristics, and L is a vector of locational characteristics. 
  While several regression models were estimated and tested, the estimation results of these 
models are not reported in this paper.  For the major purpose of this study, the market value of 
development rights are estimated using a selected regression model and the results are reported 
in Table 2.  It is clear that the average price paid by VHCB for development rights in Northern 
Vermont is significantly higher that the average market value estimated from the regression   11 
model.  This is true in terms of per property or per acre.  Detailed results of the regression 
models and estimation are available from the authors.  
  
Conclusions and implications 
Five major conclusions can be drawn from this study.  First, there is a concern by 
professional appraisers that there is systematic misspending by the VHCB.  The survey 
conducted indicated that nearly all of the appraisers with knowledge of VHCB spending believed 
that the agency was not paying market value for development rights.  The majority of these 
respondents felt that the agency was spending too much for the conservation easements.  It can 
be concluded from this survey that there is a need for further investigation into the spending 
habits of VHCB. 
Second, the results of the regression analyses indicate that the VHCB has historically 
spent in excess of market value as estimated by the regression models in this thesis.  
Considerably more acreage and a larger number of properties could have been protected with 
conservation easement restrictions had the VHCB paid closer to market value levels.  
Third, it appears that encumbered wooded land is not effected by encumbrances of 
conservation easements to a great degree.  This is likely due to the fact that many wooded land 
acreage located on farm parcels are unlikely to witness any development in the near future. 
Fourth, the percentage difference in prices per acre due to conservation easement 
encumbrances appears to be larger than the percentage difference in prices per property due to 
conservation easement encumbrances.  If easement prices are based on a percentage difference 
per acre, rather than a percentage difference per property, easement price could be easily 
inflated.     12 
Fifth, other property characteristics have a significant impact on price levels.  For 
example, stanchion barns seem to add considerably less per animal unit than do the more 
efficient freestall barns.  Dwellings and outbuildings add to prices, with dwellings contributing 
two to three times the values that outbuildings add.  Land capability classes have a significant 
impact on property values, with development capability being the more influential of the two 
classes.  Sociodemographic characteristics also contribute significantly to prices.  Population and 
per capita incomes showed positive relationships to sale price per property.  Per capita income 
seems to have a slightly higher impact on sale price than populations.  Locations of properties 
did not yield statistically significant results. 
  Purchases of development rights at prices above market value, contrary to public policy, 
have likely been engaged in by state funded PDR programs, particularly the Vermont Housing 
and Conservation Board.  There are several policy implications indicated by this behavior. 
First, the citizenry may, indeed, wish to pay more than market value for these development 
rights.  There are many reasons why a government agency might want to pay additional amounts 
over market value for conservation restrictions, as has been discussed in earlier chapters.  State 
funded PDR programs that maintain that they will purchase development rights at market value 
must be diligent in their fiduciary responsibility to taxpayers and make certain that these 
purchases are made at market value.  The alternative to this approach would be to change public 
policies, and allow state funded PDR programs to purchase development rights at a level above 
market value.  Some percentage premium could be agreed upon via traditional political 
mechanisms.  Indeed, this level of spending may be necessary for such programs to attract a 
sufficient number of contributors.  However, there is little that can be gained by purchasing these 
development rights at an above market value level, while claiming market value purchases.   13 
Second, the citizenry may wish to continue the policy of paying market value for 
properties.  If the policy of purchasing development rights at market value is to continue, then a 
thorough review of appraisal practices utilized by state funded PDR programs should be 
encouraged.  It is not enough for these agencies to merely place the onus of review on appraisers 
alone.  Although an argument can be made that PDR program personnel do not have the 
expertise to review the appraisals that they have commissioned themselves, this does not excuse 
them from their fiduciary responsibility to spend public funds efficiently.  Although inflated 
values are likely derived from appraisals written for PDR programs by private appraisers, it is the 
duty of the PDR program to make certain that these appraisals are indeed reliable.   
Third, in order to determine if these appraisals are reliable, constant review of the appraisals 
utilized by the agencies should be implemented.  All appraisals should be subject to review by at 
least one other appraiser.  One of the respondents to the Certified General Appraiser Survey in 
this report claimed that a small number of appraisers controlled the market for development 
rights.  This claim should be investigated.  If only a small number of individuals are writing 
these inflated appraisals, then the pool of qualified appraisers should be expanded.  More funds 
should be dedicated to the appraisal costs of conservation easement acquisition.  Although 
appraisals can be very expensive, as much as $6,000 to $7,000 on a very extensive project, this 
high cost is dwarfed by the potential average overpayment of approximately $87,000 per project 
as indicated by these results. 
  Fourth, it may also be in the interest of to publicly funded PDR programs to require that 
some personnel on staff attend valuation seminars or classes which include instruction as to 
appraisal procedures, terminologies, methodologies as well as Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice (USPAP).  Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service should be encouraged   14 
to examine appraisals of development rights donations utilized for tax reduction purposes more 
thoroughly. 
   15 





























































Vermont United States Source: U.S. Census of Agriculture
 
Figure 1.  Changes in farm land in the state of Vermont and the United States, 1959-1992 
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Figure 2.  Perception of professional appraisers regularding the prices of development rights paid 
by VHCB   16 
Table 1.  Variable names and descriptions 
 Variable  Full Name  Description 
SP*  Sale price  Sale price 
SPPA*  Sale price per acre  SP / TAC 
SDIND  Sale date index  Dates numbered by month 
SBS  Stanchion barn size  Number of animal units capacity 
FBS  Free stall barn size  Number of animal units capacity 
TBS  Total barn size (SBS + FBS)  Number of animal units capacity 
BQI  Barn quality index  Index, 1 to 5, 1=poor, 5=excellent 
UPRIGHT  Number of upright silo units  1 unit = 15,000 cubic ft. 
BUNKER  Number of bunker silo units  1 unit = 15,000 cubic ft. 
TSILO  Total number of silo units  UPRIGHT + BUNKER 
DS  Dwelling size  Size in square feet gross floor area 
DQC  Dwelling quality & condition index  Index, 1 to 5, 1=poor, 5=excellent 
DSQI  Dwelling size & quality index  DS × DQC 
OBN  Number of outbuildings  Square feet area of all outbuildings 
OBQC  Outbuilding quality & condition index  Average of outbuilding quality index 
OBQCNI Outbuilding  size/quality/condition 
index 
OBN × OBQC 
AWS  Animal waste storage  1= present, 0 = none 
TAC  Total acreage  Total number of acres 
BSAC  Building site acreage  Total building site acreage 
UNENCVL  Unencumbered vacant land  Total unencumbered open land acreage 
UNENCWD  Unencumbered wooded land  Total unencumbered wooded land 
ENCVL  Encumbered vacant land  Total encumbered open land acreage 
ENCWD  Encumbered wooded land  Total encumbered wooded land  
TOTUNENC  Unencumbered acreages  Total unencumbered acreages 
TOTENC  Encumbered acreages  Total encumbered acreages 
LCAG Land  Class  – Agriculture  Capability classes (1 to 11) 
LCDEV Land  Class  – Development (Septic)  Capability classes (1 to 6) 
LCI  Land Class Index  LCAG × LCDEV 
CHIT  Chittenden County  1 for Chittenden and 0 otherwise 
ABUTCHIT  Abutting Chittenden Country   1 for abutting Chittenden 
AWAYCHIT  Away from Chittenden County.  1 for away from Chittenden 
TOWNSIZE  Town Size  Town size in square miles 
TOWN90  Town population in 1990  1990 Town population 
TOWN90SQ  Square of town population in 1990  TOWN90 * TOWN90 
PERCGR  Percent town population growth  1980-90 town population growth rate 
TOTARPOP  Area population  Town & abutting towns population 
DENS80  Town population density, 1980  1980 Town population density 
DENS90  Town population density, 1990  1990 Town population density 
DENSCHNG  % change in population density  Change in 1980-90 
DENSCHNGSQ  Square of DENSCHNG  DENSCHNG * DENSCHNG 
PERCAPINC  Per capita income  1990 Town per capita income 
   17 
Table 2.  A Comparison between the estimated market value and the price paid by VHCB 












Value of development rights per acre  $416  $252  $164  39.4% 
Value of development rights per property  $142,620  $55,000  $87,620  61.4% 
   18 
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